First published in Great Britain in 1948, this book examines the definition of goodness as being distinct from the question of What things are good? Although less immediately and obviously practical, Dr. Ewing argues that the former question is more fundamental since it raises the issue of whether ethics is explicable wholly in terms of something else, for example, human psychology. Ewing states in his preface that the definition of goodness needs to be confirmed before one decides on the place value is to occupy in our conception of reality or on the ultimate characteristics which make one action right and another wrong. This book discusses these issues.
Table of Contents
Preface 1. Subjectivism 2. Naturalism 3. The Coherence Theory of Ethics, and Some Other Non-Naturalist Definitions of the Fundamental Ethical Terms 4. Different Meanings of "Good" and "Ought" 5. An Analysis of Good in Terms of Ought 6. Consequences of the Analysis for a General Theory of Ethics