The development of U.S. Army nuclear doctrine—policies, plans, procedures, tactics, and techniques—since World War II, its impact on Army forces, and its role in future wars is the subject of this policy-oriented analysis. The definition of Army nuclear doctrine advanced by the author clearly implies a distinction between policy for the employment of nuclear weapons as determined by the president and the role adduced by the Army. Dr. Rose suggests that developments—both nuclear and conventional—in U.S. Army tactical doctrine have been more responsive to political preferences held by national authorities than to the real nature of the potential threat and rigors of the nuclear battlefield. Further, he argues that the type of war preparations favored by U.S. political authorities over the last fifteen years and the type of war for which the Soviet Union is preparing differ markedly, making the U.S. Army poorly prepared for a major war.
Table of Contents
Westview Replica Editions -- Preface -- Theme -- The Two Worlds of Military Policy -- Military Doctrine as a Theory of Combat -- Nuclear Weapons: Image Versus Reality -- The Atomic Battlefield of the 1950s and 1960s: From an Invitation to Think to Stagnation in Thinking -- Nuclear Doctrinal Developments via the Army’s Educational System -- Vision of the Modern Battlefield -- The Battlefield Threat: Soviet Concepts, Doctrine, and Strategy -- “How to Fight” Doctrine and the Threat -- Nuclear Battlefield Doctrine: Past and Present -- Concept for a Nuclear Warfighting Doctrine1 -- Myths and Military Realities -- Addendum: The Need for Offensive Ground Combat Operations
John P. Rose received a Ph.D. in international relations from the University of Southern California and is currently on the faculty of the Department of Social Sciences at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point.