1st Edition

The History of Financial Crises

    1802 Pages
    by Routledge

    Since 2007, the global financial system has endured extreme turbulence with banks suffering stomach-churning losses, necessitating unbelievable bailouts by national governments. Moreover, the ongoing eurozone crisis has highlighted still further the often dysfunctional interactions between government regulators, banks, and capital markets. But, of course, these events are far from novel. The current crises prompt comparisons with the Great Depression of the 1930s, the global crisis of 1907, the international crises of the 1870s, the meltdown of 1825, the Mississippi and South Sea bubbles of 1719–20, the Roman crisis of 33AD, the default by Dionysius, tyrant of Syracuse, around 400BC, and perhaps even the financial cataclsym in Babylon that occurred more than three thousand years ago.

    The urgent necessity to locate, and learn from, successful examples of sustained recovery from severe financial crises—and to place present crises in a meaningful historical context—underscores the timeliness and usefulness of this new Routledge collection, expertly edited by Larry Neal and D’Maris Coffman. In four volumes, the collection meets the need for an authoritative reference work to allow researchers and students to make sense of a vast literature and the continuing efflorescence in research output. Users will now be able easily and rapidly to locate the best and most influential scholarship, work that is otherwise often inaccessible or scattered throughout a variety of specialist journals and books. With material gathered into one easy-to-use set, researchers and students can spend more of their time with the key journal articles, book chapters, and other pieces, rather than on time-consuming (and sometimes fruitless) archival searches.

    The History of Financial Crises is fully indexed and includes a comprehensive introduction and epilogue, newly written by the editors. It is an essential work of reference and is destined to be valued by users as a vital one-stop research resource.

    Volume I: The early modern paradigmatic cases

    1. C. P. Kindleberger, ‘The Economic Crisis of 1619 to 1623’, Journal of Economic History, Mar. 1991, 51, 1, 149–75.

    2. William A. Shaw, ‘The Monetary Movements of 1600–1621 in Holland and Germany’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society (New Series), 1895, 9, 1, 189–213.

    3. V. H. Jung, ‘Die Kipper-und wipperzeit und ihre Auswirkungen auf OberÖsterreich’, Jahrbuch des Oberösterreichischen Musealvereines, 1976, 121, 55–65.

    4. S. Quinn and W. Roberds, ‘The Bank of Amsterdam and the Leap to Central Bank Money’, American Economic Review, May 2007, 97, 2, 262–5.

    5. D. French, ‘The Dutch Monetary Environment During Tulipmania’, Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, Spring 2006, 9, 1, 3–14.

    6. P. M. Garber, Famous First Bubbles: The Fundamentals of Early Manias (Cambridge, Mass., 2000), pp. 1–47.

    7. N. W. Posthumus, ‘The Tulip Mania in Holland in the Years 1636 and 1637’, Journal of Economic and Business History, May 1929, 1, 434–66.

    8. E. A. Thompson, ‘The Tulipmania: Fact or Artifact?’, Public Choice, Jan. 2007, 130, 1–2, 99–114.

    9. L. D. Neal, ‘The Integration and Efficiency of the London and Amsterdam Stock Markets in the Eighteenth Century’, Journal of Economic History, 1987, 47, 1, 97–115.

    10. P. M. Garber, Famous First Bubbles: The Fundamentals of Early Manias (Cambridge, Mass., 2000), pp. 87–126.

    11. A. L. Murphy, ‘Trading Options Before Black-Scholes: A Study of the Market in Late Seventeenth-Century London’, Economic History Review, 2009, 62, 1, 8–30.

    12. J. Hoppit, ‘The Myths of the South Sea Bubble’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 2002, 12, 141–65.

    13. R. S. Dale, J. E. V. Johnson, and L. Tang, ‘Financial Markets Can Go Mad: Evidence of Irrational Behaviour During the South Sea Bubble’, Economic History Review, 2005, 58, 2, 233–71.

    14. G. S. Shea, ‘Financial Market Analysis Can Go Mad (in the Search for Irrational Behaviour During the South Sea Bubble)’, Economic History Review, 2007, 60, 4, 742–65.

    15. R. S. Dale, J. E. V. Johnson, and L. Tang, ‘Pitfalls in the Quest for South Sea Rationality’, Economic History Review, 2007, 60, 4, 766–72.

    16. R. G. P. Frehen, W. N. Goetzmann, and K. G. Rouwenhorst, ‘New Evidence on the First Financial Bubbles’ (Yale International Center for Finance, Working Paper No. 09-04 (July 2012)).

    17. F. Velde, ‘Was John Law’s System a Bubble? The Mississippi Bubble Revisited’, in L. D. Neal and J. Atak (eds.), The Origins and Development of Financial Markets and Institutions (Cambridge, 2009).

    18. P. T. Hoffman, J.-L. Rosenthal, and G. Postel-Vinay, ‘The Crisis of Public Finance and the Law Affair, 1712–6’, Priceless Markets: The Political Economy of Credit in Paris, 1660–1870 (Chicago, 2000).

    19. Émile Levasseur, ‘Chute du Systeme’, Recherches historiques sur le système de Law (Guillaumin et cie, 1854), pp. 190–236.

    Volume II: The Growth of Financial Capitalism

    20. Shigeru Wakita, ‘Efficiency of the Dojima Rice Futures Market in Tokugawa-Period Japan’, Journal of Banking & Finance, 2001, 25, 3, 535–54.

    21. A. J. Arnold and S. McCartney, ‘Veritable Gold Mines Before the Arrival of Railway Competition: But Did Dividends Signal Rates of Return in the English Canal Industry?’, Economic History Review, 2011, 64, 214–36.

    22. D. J. Cowen, ‘The First Bank of the United States and the Securities Market Crash of 1792’, Journal of Economic History, Dec. 2000, 60, 4, 1041–60.

    23. L. D. Neal, ‘The Bank of England’s First Return to Gold and the Stock Market Crash of 1825’, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, May/June 1998, 79, 53–76.

    24. David M. Williams and John Armstrong, ‘Promotion, Speculation and their Outcome: The "Steamship Mania" of 1824–1825’, Aslib Proceedings, 2008, 60, 6, 642–60.

    25. R. Harris, ‘Political Economy, Interest Groups, Legal Institutions and the Repeal of the Bubble Act in 1825’, Economic History Review, Nov. 1997, 50, 4, 675–96.

    26. Peter L. Rousseau, ‘Jacksonian Monetary Policy, Specie Flows, and the Panic of 1837’, Journal of Economic History, 2002, 62, 2, 457–88.

    27. S. McCartney and A. J. Arnold, ‘The Railway Mania of 1845–1847: Market Irrationality or Collusive Swindle Based on Accounting Distortions?’, Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 2003, 16, 5, 821–52.

    28. G. Campbell, ‘Myopic Rationality in a Mania’, Explorations in Economic History, Jan. 2012, 49, 1, 75–91.

    29. Charles W. Calomiris and Larry Schweikart, ‘The Panic of 1857: Origins, Transmission, and Containment’, Journal of Economic History, 1991, 51, 4, 807–34.

    30. Morgan Kelly and Cormac Ó Gráda, ‘Market Contagion: Evidence from the Panics of 1854 and 1857’, American Economic Review, 2000, 90, 5, 1110–24.

    31. James L. Huston, ‘Western Grains and the Panic of 1857’, Agricultural History, 1983, 57, 1, 14–32.

    32. W. Bagehot, Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market (1873), pp. 162–303.

    33. Warren M. Persons, Pierson M. Tuttle, and Edwin Frickey, ‘Business and Financial Conditions Following the Civil War in the United States’, Review of Economic Statistics 2, 1920, 5–21.

    34. Peter Mixon, ‘The Crisis of 1873: Perspectives from Multiple Asset Classes’, Journal of Economic History, 2008, 68, 3, 722–57.

    Volume III: The Gold-Standard Era

    35. B. Eichengreen, ‘The Baring Crisis in a Mexican Mirror’, International Political Science Review, 1999, 20, 3, 249–70.

    36. G. D. Triner and K. Wandschneider, ‘The Baring Crisis and the Brazilian Encilhamento, 1889–1891: An Early Example of Contagion Among Emerging Capital Markets’, Financial History Review, Oct. 2005, 2, 199–225.

    37. J Körnert, ‘The Barings Crises of 1890 and 1895: Causes, Courses, Consequences and the Danger of Domino Effects’, Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, July 2003, 13, 3, 187–209.

    38. Hugh Rockoff, ‘The "Wizard of Oz" as a Monetary Allegory’, Journal of Political Economy, 1990, 98, 4, 739–60.

    39. C. R. Hickson and J. D. Turner, ‘Free Banking Gone Awry: The Australian Banking Crisis of 1893’, Financial History Review, Oct. 2002, 9, 2, 147–67.

    40. M. Carlson, ‘Causes of Bank Suspensions in the Panic of 1893’, Explorations in Economic History, 2005, 42, 1, 56–80.

    41. C. D. Ramirez, ‘Bank Fragility, "Money Under the Mattress", and Long-Run Growth: US Evidence from the "Perfect" Panic of 1893’, Journal of Banking & Finance, Dec. 2009, 33, 12, 2185–98.

    42. O. M. W. Sprague, ‘The American Crisis of 1907’, Economic Journal, Sept. 1908, 18, 71, 353–72.

    43. Kerry A. Odell and Marc D. Weidenmier, ‘Real Shock, Monetary Aftershock: The 1906 San Francisco Earthquake and the Panic of 1907’, Journal of Economic History, 2004, 64, 4, 1002–27.

    44. Gary Gorton and Lixin Huang, ‘Bank Panics and the Endogeneity of Central Banking’, Journal of Monetary Economics, 2006, 53, 7, 1613–29.

    45. Jon Moen and Ellis Tallman, ‘The Bank Panic of 1907: The Role of the Trust Companies’, Journal of Economic History, 1992, 52, 3, 611–30.

    46. Jon Moen and E. Tallman, ‘Liquidity Creation Without a Central Bank: Clearing House Certificates in the Banking Panic of 1907’, Journal of Financial Stability, Dec. 2012, 8, 4, 277–91.

    47. Michael D. Bordo and Hugh Rockoff, ‘Not Just the Great Contraction: Friedman and Schwartz’s A Monetary History of the United States 1867 to 1960’, American Economic Review, May 2013, 103, 3, 61–5.

    48. B. Bernanke, ‘Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the Great Depression’, American Economic Review, 1983, 73, 257–76.

    49. B. Bernanke, ‘The Macroeconomics of the Great Depression: A Comparative Approach’, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 1995, 27, 1–28.

    50. B. Bernanke and H. James, ‘The Gold Standard, Deflation, and Financial Crisis in the Great Depression: An International Comparison’, in R. Glenn Hubbard (ed.), Financial Markets and Financial Crises (University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 33–68.

    51. C. W. Calomiris, ‘Financial Factors in the Great Depression’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1993, 7, 61–85.

    52. E. McGratten and E. Prescott, ‘The 1929 Stock Market: Irving Fisher was Right?’, International Economic Review, 2004, 45, 991–1009.

    53. P. Rappaport and E. N. White, ‘Was There a Bubble in the 1929 Market?’, Journal of Economic History, 1993, 53, 3, 549–74.

    54. Isabel Schnabel, ‘The Role of Liquidity and Implicit Guarantees in the German Twin Crisis of 1931’, Journal of International Money and Finance, Feb. 2009, 28, 1, 1–25.

    55. E. N. White, ‘The Stock Market Boom and Crash of 1929 Revisited’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1990, 4, 67–83.

    56. Joseph L. Lucia, ‘The Failure of the Bank of United States: A Reappraisal’, Explorations in Economic History, Oct. 1985, 22, 4, 402–16.

    57. Y. Chen and I. Hasan, ‘Why Do Bank Runs Look Like Panic? A New Explanation’, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 40, 2–3, 2008, 535–546

    58. William H. Janeway, ‘The 1931 Sterling Crisis and the Independence of the Bank of England’, Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 1995, 251–68.

    Volume IV: The Modern Era

    59. Asher A. Blass and Richard S. Grossman, ‘Assessing Damages: The 1983 Israeli Bank Shares Crisis’, Contemporary Economic Policy, 2001, 19, 1, 49–58.

    60. Carlos F. Diaz-Alejandro, Paul R. Krugman, and Jeffrey D. Sachs, ‘Latin American Debt: I Don’t Think We are in Kansas Anymore’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1984, 2, 335–403.

    61. John B. Shoven, Scott B. Smart, and Joel Waldfogel, ‘Real Interest Rates and the Savings and Loan Crisis: The Moral Hazard Premium’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1992, 6, 1, 155–67.

    62. M. Mazen Anbari, ‘Banking on a Bailout: Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance Policy Exclusions in the Context of the Savings and Loan Crisis’, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 1992, 141, 2, 547–89.

    63. Barney Warf and Joseph C. Cox, ‘Spatial Dimensions of the Savings and Loan Crisis’, Growth and Change, 1996, 27, 2, 135–55.

    64. Mark Rubinstein, ‘Portfolio Insurance and the Market Crash’, Financial Analysts Journal, 1988, 38–47.

    65. J. Patrick Raines and Charles G. Leathers, ‘The New Speculative Stock Market: Why the Weak Immunizing Effect of the 1987 Crash?’, Journal of Economic Issues, 1994, 28, 3, 733–53.

    66. John J. Merrick Jr, ‘Crisis Dynamics of Implied Default Recovery Ratios: Evidence from Russia and Argentina’, Journal of Banking & Finance, 2001, 25, 10, 1921–39.

    67. Mardi Dungey et al., ‘Contagion in International Bond Markets During the Russian and the LTCM crises’, Journal of Financial Stability, 2006, 2, 1, 1–27.

    68. C. Perez, ‘The Double Bubble at the Turn of the Century: Technological Roots and Structural Implications’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 2009, 33, 4, 779–805.

    69. William Goetzmann, Liang Peng, and Jacqueline Yen, ‘The Subprime Crisis and House Price Appreciation’, Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Jan. 2012, 44, 1, 36–66.


    Edited and with a new introduction by Larry Neal, Professor Emeritus of Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA, Visiting Professor, LSE; and D’Maris Coffman, Director of the Centre for Financial History, Newnham College, Cambridge