This new book looks at the relationship between the Israeli armed forces, the government, and the origins of the 1967 War.
Ami Gluska discusses the effect of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) on Israel’s defense policy between 1963-1967 against the backdrop of the developments in the Middle East. In addition, he describes in detail the decision-making process leading to the Arab-Israeli Six Day War in June 1967 through the prism of the relations between the military and political echelons. He shows how the Six Day War was a watershed event in the Middle-Eastern conflict and had a profound effect on the development of the Palestinian problem and the character of the State of Israel over the past four decades.
This book will be of great interest to students of Middle Eastern politics, strategic studies, Israeli politics and military history in general.
Table of Contents
Introduction 1. Personnel Changes in the Defense Establishment 2. Basic Security Issues 3. Escalation - Stage 1: From Skirmishes in the Demilitarized Zones to Aerial Sorties 4. Escalation - Stage 2: Diversion 5. The Dispute with Syria Worsens 6. Escalation - Stage 3: 'Harassment' 7. The General Staff Wants a 'Frontal Clash' 8. Israel-Jordan: The Israeli Dilemma, the Jordanian Dilemma 9. The Clash with Syria Approaches 10. Conflagration 11. The Trigger 12. The Start of the Crisis 13. The Era of Diplomacy 14. The Revision of Intelligence Evaluation and the Shift to Offensive Planning 15. Casus Belli 16. The Army Pressures the Government 17. The Politicians' Quandary 18. The Height of the Diplomatic Campaign - and the Outcome 19. Waiting 20. Establishment of a National Unity Government: The Military Aspect 21. The Strategic Turning Point: The Egypt-Jordan Defense Pact 22. The Decisive Meeting in the Pit: The Ministerial Committee versus the General Staff 23. The Decisive Stage: War