When originally published in 1984, and based on archival research, this book was the first fully documented discussion of German naval strategy and planning from 1862-1914 against France, Russia, Great Britain, the United States and Japan. The book is a complete study of the relationship of the navy to Prusso-German power politics both in terms of the complexity of the problems discussed and in the length of the period covered. It will be invaluable to students of naval and military history, strategy and diplomacy, as well as those of German history.
Table of Contents
1. Beginnings of Construction, 1862-88 2. Operations Plans Under Stosch and Caprivi 1877-88 3. Wilhelm’s Naval Dreams 4. Foreign Policy and Naval Operations, 1888-89 5. Coordination of the Army and Navy for Coastal Defense, 1889-95 6. The New Era and the Rise of Tirpitz, 1890-95 7. Incompetent Naval Planning for an Improbable Continental War, 1895-99 8. The Navy and World Power, I: Transoceanic Tension and Operational Planning Against Great Britain and in Non-European Waters, 1895-99 9. The Navy and World Power, II: Tirpitz and the First and Second Navy Laws, 1897-1900 10. The Acceptance of the Tirpitz Plan, 1897-1905 11. Diplomatic Background to Naval Operations, 1899-1904 12. Naval Preparation for War, 1899-1905 13. Diplomacy and Operational Planning in the Face of War, 1904-06 14. The Challenge to Britain: The Navy Laws of 1906 and 1908 and Increased War Preparedness 15. Foreign Policy from Algeciras to Agadir, 1906-11 16. Groping for Viable Naval Operations Plans in European Waters, 1905-11 17. The Eclipse of the Tirpitz Plan, 1911-14 18. Naval Operational Planning from Agadir to the July Crisis, 1914 19. Epilogue and Conclusions
N. I. Lambi