The Phenomenology of Self-Awareness and the Nature of Conscious Subjects

Introduction: Self-Experience and the Metaphysics of Conscious Subjects Donnchadh O’Conaill

Part I: Self-Awareness and Conscious Experience

1. Experience, Reflection, and Pre-Reflection Charles Siewert
Reflection Without Classification: Comments on Siewert Matt Duncan
Reflective Feature Identification and the Pre-Reflective Awareness of One's Phenomenally Conscious Mental States: Comment on Siewert Terry Horgan
Responses to Horgan’s and Duncan’s Comments on "Experience, Reflection, and Pre-Reflection" Charles Siewert

2. How to Attend to Yourself as a Subject Julien Bugnon
On Consciousness of Self as Subject: Comments on Bugnon Charles Siewert
On Phenomenal Presentation: A Response to Siewert Julien Bugnon

3. Hiding in Plain Sight? On the Elusiveness of the Self Donnchadh O’Conaill
Not Quite in Plain Sight: Comments on O’Conaill Robert J. Howell
Response to Howell Donnchadh O’Conaill

Part II: The Metaphysical Nature of Conscious Subjects

4. The Illusion of the Enduring Self Katalin Balog
On How We Have Access to Our Own Metaphysical Nature: A Comment on Balog Martine Nida-Rümelin
Response to Martine’s Comments Katalin Balog

5. Agentive Self-Awareness and the Nature of the Conscious Self Terry Horgan
Genuine Activity and Scientific Evidence: Comment on Horgan Martine Nida-Rümelin
Embracing the Robot Hypothesis: Reply to Martine Nida-Rümelin’s Comment Terry Horgan

6. The Hard Problem of the Self: A Case for Substance Dualism? Robert J. Howell
Knowledge about Subjects Versus Phenomenal Knowledge: Comments on Howell Julien Bugnon
Response to Julien’s Comments Robert J. Howell

7. In Defence of Phenomenal Sharing Philip Goff and Luke Roelofs
What is a Phenomenal Token? Comment on Goff and Roelofs Donnchadh O’Conaill
Response to O’Conaill Philip Goff and Luke Roelofs

Part III: What Self-Awareness Reveals About the Nature of Conscious Subjects

8. What is it for an Experience to Belong to a Subject? A Phenomenological Argument for the Simple View Martine Nida-Rümelin
Belonging and the Subject: Not So Simple—Comment on Nida-Rümelin Philip Goff and Luke Roelofs
Reply to Comment by Luke Roelofs and Philip Goff Martine Nida-Rümelin

9. What Self-Acquaintance Says About Us Matt Duncan
Can Personal Identity be Reduced to Phenomenal Continuity? Comment on Duncan Katja Crone
Response to Crone Matt Duncan

10. Persistence of Persons: Limits of a First-Personal Criterion Katja Crone
Comments on Katja Crone "Limits of a First-Personal Criterion" Katalin Balog
Response to Comment by Katalin Balog Katja Crone

Biography

Julien Bugnon is currently Postdoctoral Researcher in the project “Essential Indexicality and Thoughts about Experience” (jointly funded by the French National Research Agency and the Swiss National Science Foundation). His research interests lie in philosophy of mind, phenomenology, and epistemology, with a focus on consciousness—particularly its relation to values, introspection, self-knowledge, and artificial intelligence.

Martine Nida-Rümelin is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Fribourg. Her published work focuses on phenomenal consciousness, the identity of conscious subjects across time and possible worlds, the phenomenology of self-awareness, and the capacity of conscious subjects to engage in active behaviour. An account of what it is to be an experiencing being that integrates these different topics is elaborated in her book Conscious Individuals (forthcoming).

Donncahdh O’Conaill is an independent researcher whose works focuses on philosophy of mind and metaphysics. He has written articles including "Subjecthood Transparency" (Analysis), "Subjectivity and Non-Objectifying Awareness" (Review of Philosophy & Psychology), "Subjectivity and Mineness" (Erkenntnis), and "The Identity of Experiences and the Identity of the Subject" (Philosophical Studies).