1848 Pages
    by Routledge

    The study of human behaviour, and the minds that produce that behaviour, has been an occupation of scholars, artists, and philosophers for millennia. But it was not until the turn of the twentieth century that psychology came into its own as a distinct field of study—and, more importantly, as a scientifically legitimate field of study. When we view psychology as a science, certain questions naturally emerge: what sorts of phenomena does psychology seek to explain? What is distinctive about the kinds of explanations adduced in this science? How do these explanations integrate with theories and explanations in other fields of study? Does psychology aim to explain all mental phenomena, or are there some areas, such as consciousness, that will be forever beyond its explanatory powers?

    Due to its very nature, psychology is a field that both philosophers and scientists have critically examined over the years. This critical examination has, in turn, generated a literature that is voluminous, heavily contested, and increasingly technical.

    To help users to make sense of this large and complex scholarly corpus, this new four-volume collection from Routledge is both comprehensive and sensitive to the ongoing nature of debates in the field. Two expert editors have carefully assembled classic contributions, as well as more recent work, to create an indispensable ‘mini library’ of the best and most influential scholarship in the philosophy of psychology.

    With a comprehensive index and newly written introductions by the editors, The Philosophy of Psychology will be welcomed by a broad range of scholars, researchers, and advanced students, especially those working in philosophy, psychology, linguistics, and cognitive science.

    Volume I: Representation and Mind

    Part 1. Information Processing and Computational Theories

    1. Stephen E. Palmer and Ruth Kimchi, ‘The Information Processing Approach to Cognition’, in Terry J. Knapp and Lynn C. Robertson (eds.), Approaches to Cognition: Contrasts and Controversies (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Earlbaum and Associates, 1986), pp. 37–77.

    2. Ned Block, ‘The Mind as the Software of the Brain’, in Daniel N. Osherson, Lila Gleitman, Stephen M. Kosslyn, S. Smith, and Saadya Sternberg (eds.), An Invitation to Cognitive Science (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), pp. 1–22.

    3. Jerry A. Fodor, ‘Fodor’s Guide to Mental Representation: The Intelligent Auntie’s Vade-Mecum’, Mind, 1995, 44, 76–100.

    4. Hubert Dreyfus, ‘The Situation: Orderly Behavior Without Recourse to Rules’, What Computers Can’t Do (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1972/1979), pp. 256–91.

    5. Stephen Stich, ‘The Strong Representational Theory of the Mind’, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983), pp. 127–48.

    6. Daniel Dennett, ‘Cognitive Wheels: The Frame Problem in A I’, in C. Hookway (ed.), Minds, Machines and Evolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 129–50.

    Part 2. Connectionist Models

    7. Paul M. Churchland, ‘On the Nature of Theories: A Neurocomputational Perspective’, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 1989, 14, 59–86, 97–101.

    8. William Ramsey, Stephen Stich, and Joseph Garon, ‘Connectionism, Eliminativism and the Future of Folk Psychology’, Philosophical Perspectives, 1990, 4, 499–533.

    9. William Bechtel, ‘The Case for Connectionism’, Philosophical Studies, 71, 2, 1993, 119–54.

    10. William Ramsey, ‘Do Connectionist Representations Earn their Explanatory Keep?’, Mind and Language, 1997, 12, 34–66.

    Part 3. Non-Representational Theories of Mind

    11. Timothy van Gelder, ‘What Might Cognition Be, if Not Computation?’, Journal of Philosophy, 1995, 92, 7, 345–81.

    12. Rodney A. Brooks, ‘Intelligence without Representation’, Artificial Intelligence, 1991, 47, 139–59.

    13. John Haugeland, ‘Mind Embodied and Embedded’, Having Thought: Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), pp. 207–37.

    14. Andy Clark and Josefa Toribio, ‘Doing Without Representing?’, Synthese, 2005, 101, 401–31.

    Volume II: The Organization of the Mind

    Part 4. Classical Conceptions of Modularity

    15. Jerry A. Fodor, The Modularity of Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983), pp. 10–23, 38–119.

    16. Jack C. Lyons, ‘Carving the Mind at its (Not Necessarily Modular) Joints’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Psychology, 2001, 52, 277–302.

    17. Jesse J. Prinz, ‘Is the Mind Really Modular?’, in R. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), pp. 22-36.

    18. Peter Carruthers, ‘On Fodor’s Problem’, Mind and Language, 2003, 18, 5, 502–23.

    Part 5. Massive Modularity, Evolutionary Psychology, and Dual Systems Theory

    19. Leda Cosmindes and John Tooby, ‘Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange’, in J. Barkow, L. Cosmindes, and J. Tooby (eds.), The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 163–228.20. David J. Buller and Valerie Gray Hardcastle, ‘Evolutionary Psychology, Meet Developmental Neurobiology: Against Promiscuous Modularity’, Brain and Mind, 2000, 1, 3, 307–25.

    21. Richard Samuels, ‘Evolutionary Psychology and the Massive Modularity Hypothesis’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1998, 49, 4, 575–602.

    22. Ron Mallon and Stephen Stich, ‘The Odd Couple: The Compatibility of Social Construction and Evolutionary Psychology’, Philosophy of Science, 2000, 67, 1, 133–54.

    Part 6. Localization and Identity

    23. Tim Shallice, From Neuropsychology to Mental Structure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) (extracts).

    24. Martha J. Farah, ‘Neuropsychological Inference with an Interactive Brain: A Critique of the "Locality" Assumption’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1994, 17, 1, 43–61.

    25. Michael L. Anderson, ‘Massive Redeployment, Exaptation, and the Functional Integration of Cognitive Operations’, Synthese, 2007, 159, 3, 329–45.

    26. Ned Block and Jerry A. Fodor, ‘What Psychological States Are Not’, Philosophical Review, 1972, 81, 159–81.

    27. Lawrence Shapiro, ‘How to Test for Multiple Realizability’, Philosophy of Science, 2008, 75, 514–25.

    28. David Barrett, ‘Multiple Realizability, Identity Theory, and the Gradual Reorganization Principle’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (forthcoming)

    Part 7. Capacities, Functions, and Mechanisms

    29. Robert Cummins, ‘"How Does it Work?" vs. "What are the Laws?" Two Conceptions of Psychological Explanation’, in J. L. Bermudez (ed.), Contemporary Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 90–8.

    30. Jennifer Mundale and William P. Bechtel, ‘Integrating Neuroscience, Psychology, and Evolutionary Biology Through a Teleological Conception of Function’, Minds and Machines, 1996, 6, 4, 481–505.

    31. Gualtiero Piccinini and Carl Craver, ‘Integrating Psychology and Neuroscience: Functional Analyses as Mechanism Sketches’, Synthese, 2011, 183, 3, 283–311.

    32. Daniel Weiskopf, ‘Models and Mechanisms in Psychological Explanation’, Synthese, 2011, 183, 3, 313–38.

    Part 8. Tools for Studying Mental Structure

    33. John C. Dunn and Kim Kirsner, ‘What Can we Infer from Double Dissociations?’, Cortex, 2003, 39, 1–7.

    34. Max Coltheart and Martin Davies, ‘Inference and Explanation in Cognitive Neuropsychology’, Cortex, 2003, 39, 188–91.

    35. Guy C. Van Ordern and Heidi Kloos, ‘The Module Mistake’, Cortex, 2003, 39, 164–6.

    36. Jack C. Lyons, ‘Lesion Studies, Spared Performance, and Cognitive Systems’, Cortex, 2003, 39, 145–7.

    37. Steven E. Petersen and Julie A. Fiez, ‘The Processing of Single Words Studied with Positron Emission Tomography’, in William Bechtel, Pete Mandik, Jennifer Mundale, and Robert S. Stufflebeam (eds.), Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2001), pp. 112–28.

    38. Martin Sarter, Gary G. Bernston, and John T. Cacioppo, ‘Brain Imaging and Cognitive Neuroscience: Toward Strong Inference in Attributing Function to Structure’, American Psychologist, 1996, 51, 13–21.

    39. Russell A. Poldrack, ‘Can Cognitive Processes be Inferred from Neuroimaging Data?’, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2006, 10, 59–63.

    40. Dennis J. L. G. Schutter, Jack Van Honk, and Jaak Panksepp, ‘Introducing Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) and its Property of Causal Inference in Investigating Brain-Function Relationships’, Synthese, 2004, 141, 155–73.

    Volume III: Special Topics 1: Language, Thought, and Belief

    Part 9. Animal Mentality

    41. Nick Chater and Cecilia Heyes, ‘Animal Concepts: Content and Discontent’, Mind & Language, 1994, 9, 3, 209–46.

    42. Elliot Sober, ‘Comparative Psychology Meets Evolutionary Biology: Morgan's Canon and Cladistic Parsimony’, in Lorraine Datson and Gregg Mitman (eds.), Thinking with Animals: New Perspectives on Anthropomorphism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), pp. 85–99.

    43. Brian Keeley, ‘Anthropomorphism, Primatomorphism, Mammalomorphism: Understanding Cross-Species Comparisons’, Biology and Philosophy, 2004, 19, 521–40.

    44. Colin Allen, ‘Animals Concepts Revisited: The Use of Self-Monitoring as an Empirical Approach’, Erkenntnis, 1999, 51, 33–40.

    Part 10. Delusions

    45. Tony Stone and Andrew W. Young, ‘Delusions and Brain Injury: The Philosophy and Psychology of Belief’, Mind and Language, 1997, 12, 3–4, 327–64.

    46. John Campbell, ‘Rationality, Meaning and the Analysis of Delusion’, Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology, 2001, 8, 89–100.

    47. Tim Bayne and Elisabeth Pacherie, ‘Bottom-Up or Top-Down: Campbell’s Rationalist Account of Monothematic Delusions’, Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology, 2004, 11, 1, 1–11.

    Part 11. Mindreading

    48. Heinz Wimmer and Josef Perner, ‘Beliefs about Beliefs: Representation and Constraining Function of Wrong Beliefs in Young Children’s Understanding of Deception’, Cognition, 1983, 13, 103–28.

    49. Alan M. Leslie, ‘Pretense and Representation: The Origins of "Theory of Mind"’, Psychological Review, 1987, 94, 4, 412–26.

    50. Simon Baron-Cohen, ‘Developing Mindreading: The Four Steps’, Mindblindness: An Essay on Autism and Theory of Mind (Bradford, 1997), pp. 31–58.

    51. Robert M. Gordon, ‘Folk Psychology as Simulation’, Mind and Language, 1986, 1, 2, 158–71.

    52. Peter Carruthers, ‘How We Know Our Own Minds: The Relationship Between Mindreading and Metacognition’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2009, 32, 2, 121–38.

    Part 12. Thought’s Dependence on Language

    53. Lila Gleitman and Anna Papafragou, ‘Language and Thought’, in K. Holyoak and B. Morrison (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 633–61.

    54. Andy Clark, ‘Magic Words: How Language Augments Human Computation’, in Peter Carruthers and Jill Boucher (eds.), Language and Thought: Interdisciplinary Themes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 162–83.

    55. José Luis Bermúdez, ‘Language and Thinking about Thoughts’, Thinking Without Words (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 150–64.

    56. Robert W. Lurz, ‘In Defense of Wordless Thoughts About Thoughts’, Mind and Language, 2007, 22, 3, 270–96.

    Part 13. Dual Systems of Reasoning

    57. Steven A. Sloman, ‘The Empirical Case for Two Systems of Reasoning’, Psychological Bulletin, 1996, 119, 1, 3–22.

    58. Peter Carruthers, ‘An Architecture for Dual Reasoning’, in J. Evans and K. Frankish (eds.), In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 109–28.

    Volume IV: Special Topics 2: Consciousness, Happiness, and Free Will

    Part 14. The Neural Correlates of Consciousness

    59. Ned Block, ‘How Not To Find the Neural Correlate of Consciousness’ (Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures, 1996).

    60. Daniel Dennett and Marcel Kinsbourne, ‘Time and the Observer: The Where and When of Consciousness in the Brain’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1992, 15, 2, 183–201.

    61. David J. Chalmers, ‘Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness’, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 1995, 2, 3, 200–19.

    62. Jakob Hohwy, ‘The Neural Correlates of Consciousness: New Experimental Approaches Needed?’, Consciousness and Cognition, 2009, 18, 428–38.

    Part 15. Introspection

    63. Richard E. Nisbett and Timothy D. Wilson, ‘Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes’, Psychological Review, 1977, 84, 3, 231–59.

    64. Eric Schwitzgebel, ‘The Unreliability of Naive Introspection’, Philosophical Review, 2008, 117, 2, 245–73.

    65. Daniel C. Dennett, ‘Who’s on First? Heterophenomenology Explained’, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2003, 10, 9, 19–30.

    Part 16. Happiness

    66. Richard M. Ryan and Edward L. Deci, ‘On Happiness and Human Potentials: A Review of Research on Hedonic and Eudaimonic Well-being’, Annual Review of Psychology, 2001, 52, 141–66.

    67. Valerie Tiberius, ‘Cultural Differences and Philosophical Accounts of Well-Being’, The Journal of Happiness Studies, 2004, 5, 293–314.

    68. Daniel M. Haybron, ‘Do We Know How Happy We Are? On Some Limits of Affective Introspection and Recall’, Noûs, 2007, 41, 3, 394–428.

    69. Anne Alexandrova, ‘First-Person Reports and the Measurement of Happiness’, Philosophical Psychology, 2008, 21, 5, 571–83.

    Part 17. Free Will

    70. Benjamin W. Libet, ‘Do We Have Free Will?’, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 1999, 6, 47–57.

    71. Daniel M. Wegner and Thalia Wheatley, ‘Apparent Mental Causation: Sources of the Experience of Will’, American Psychologist, 1999, 54, 480–92.

    72. Eddy Nahmias, D. Justin Coates and Trevor Kvaran, ‘Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Mechanism: Experiments on Folk Intuitions’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 2007, 31, 1, 214–42.