1st Edition

The Political Economy of Protection

By Arye L. Hillman Copyright 1989
    184 Pages
    by Taylor & Francis

    178 Pages
    by Taylor & Francis

    This book examines how trade policy is determined in democratic countries, and illustrates how protectionist policies are engendered by political processes that allow groups to pursue their own interests.

    Introduction: The Efficiency of Free Trade and The Prevalence of Protection; Chapter 1 1. Identifying the Gainers and Losers from Protection; Chapter 2 2. Political Self-Interest Motives and Protection; Chapter 3 3. Protection under Direct Democracy; Chapter 4 4. Protection under Representative Democracy; Chapter 5 5. Shadow Prices of Factors and the Social Cost of Lobbying; Chapter 6 6. The Resource Cost of Political Contestability; Chapter 7 7. Political Choice of the Means of Protection; Chapter 8 8. Foreign Interests: The Role for Voluntary Export Restraints; Chapter 9 9. Trade Policy as Social Insurance; Chapter 10 10. The Institutional Setting; Chapter 11 11. Evidence; Chapter 12 12. Concluding Remarks;


    Arye L. Hillman