1st Edition
The Political Economy of Redistribution in Indonesia Political Patronage and Favoritism in Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfer Allocations
This book analyses how different institutional intergovernmental transfer designs influence patronage and favoritism in public fund allocations in Indonesia.
Presenting original research and investigating existing theories on the determinants of public fund allocations, the book uses Indonesia as a case study. Indonesia, often claimed to be characterized by money politics, provides an ideal setting for this analysis. The countries' decentralized fiscal system consists of various institutional intergovernmental transfer designs allocating public funds to a large variety of districts to finance public service provision. The author exploits those distinctive differences between various institutional intergovernmental transfer designs and investigates their influence on the prevalence of favoritism and patronage in public funds allocations while holding the political system, the observation period, and the government officials involved constant.
A valuable contribution to the literature on the political economy of redistribution, this book will be of interest to academics working on economics and political science, particularly in public finance and development economics, but also in development studies or Southeast Asian studies.
1. Introduction; 2. Indonesia’s Intergovernmental Transfer System; 3. Patronage in Central-Discretionary Transfer Allocations; 4. Favoritism in Subnational-Discretionary Transfer Allocations; 5. Patronage and Favoritism in Formula-Based Transfer Allocations; 6. Conclusion; Appendix; Bibliography; Index
Biography
Gerrit J. Gonschorek is a Consultant at The World Bank, Governance Global Practice (GGP), Jakarta, Indonesia. He received his PhD from the Institute of Economics, Department of International Economic Policy, Albert-Ludwigs-University Freiburg, Germany.
“Using Indonesia as a case study, this book examines how different institutional intergovernmental transfer designs influence patronage and favoritism in public funding allocations. Located at the intersection of Economics and Political Science, the author thoughtfully employs existing analytical frameworks and modifies them to the circumstances of a young and evolving democracy characterized by highly personalistic politics and a weak party system. It is a very fine piece of research.”
– Hal Hill, Australian National University
