1st Edition
The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence
What one can know depends on one’s evidence. Good scientific theories are supported by evidence. Our experiences provide us with evidence. Any sort of inquiry involves the seeking of evidence. It is irrational to believe contrary to your evidence. For these reasons and more, evidence is one of the most fundamental notions in the field of epistemology and is emerging as a crucial topic across academic disciplines.
The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence is an outstanding reference source to the key topics, problems, and debates in this exciting subject and is the first major volume of its kind. Comprising forty chapters by an international team of contributors the handbook is divided into six clear parts:
- The Nature of Evidence
- Evidence and Probability
- The Social Epistemology of Evidence
- Sources of Evidence
- Evidence and Justification
- Evidence in the Disciplines
The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence is essential reading for students and researchers in philosophy of science and epistemology, and will also be of interest to those in related disciplines across the humanities and social sciences, such as law, religion, and history.
Introduction Maria Lasonen-Aarnio and Clayton Littlejohn
Part 1: The Nature of Evidence
1. Experience as Evidence Chris Tucker
2. E = K, but What About R? Timothy Williamson
3. Epistemological Disjunctivism and Evidence Duncan Pritchard
4. Evidential Internalism and Evidential Externalism Giada Fratantonio
5. The Evidential Support Relation of Evidentialism T. Ryan Byerly
6. How Can "Evidence" be Normative? Ralph Wedgwood
Part 2: Evidence and Probability
7. Varieties of Measures of Evidential Support Peter Brössel
8. Positive Relevance Peter Achinstein
9. The Paradoxes of Confirmation Jan Sprenger
10. Good Predictions and Bad Accommodations Eric Christian Barnes
11. Bayesian Norms and Non-Ideal Agents Julia Staffel
12. The Value of Evidence Bernhard Salow
13. Sleeping Beauty’s Evidence Jeffrey Sanford Russell
14. Higher-Order Evidence Kevin Dorst
Part 3: The Social Epistemology of Evidence
15. Evidence and Power: Feminist Approaches to Evidence Kristen Intemann
16. Evidence, Relativism and Progress in Feminist Standpoint Theory Natalie Alana Ashton
17. Epistemic Injustice in Collecting and Appraising Evidence David Schraub and Joel Sati
18. Prejudiced Belief: Evidential Considerations Endre Begby
19. Evidence and Bias Nick Hughes
20. Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence Jonathan Matheson
Part 4: Sources of Evidence
21. Intuitions as Evidence: An Introduction Marc A. Moffett
22. The Evidence in Perception Ali Hasan
23. Testimony and Evidence Nick Leonard
24. Introspection and Evidence Alex Byrne
25. Explanation and Evidence Kevin McCain and Ted Poston
Part 5: Evidence and Justification
26. Prospects for Evidentialism Bob Beddor
27. Permissivism, Underdetermination, and Evidence Elisabeth Jackson and Greta LaFore
28. Moral Encroachment and Evidence Jessica Brown
29. Evidence and Virtue (and Beyond) Kurt L. Sylvan
30. Propositional Justification and Doxastic Justification Paul Silva Jr. and Luis R.G. Oliveira
31. Evidence and Epistemic Reasons Errol Lord
32. Fallibilism and a Guarantee of Truth Charity Anderson
33. Evidence and Inductive Inference Nevin Climenhaga
Part 6: Evidence in the Disciplines
34. Legal Evidence and Knowledge Georgi Gardiner
35. Evidence in Logic Ben Martin and Ole Thomassen Hjortland
36. Evidence: From Science to Policy Eleonora Montuschi
37. Theory and Evidence in Economics Julian Reiss
38. Evidence-Based Medicine and Evidence-Based Public Health Benjamin Smart
39. Evidence in Classical Statistics Samuel C. Fletcher and Conor Mayo-Wilson
40. Scientific Evidence Alexander Bird
Index
Biography
Maria Lasonen-Aarnio is Professor of Theoretical Philosophy at the University of Helsinki, Finland. She has published on a wide range of topics within epistemology, philosophy of mind, and the study of normality. Her book The Good, the Bad and the Feasible (2024) defends a novel normative framework and applies it to various problems and puzzles in epistemology and beyond.
Clayton Littlejohn is Professor of Philosophy at the Dianoia Institute of Philosophy at the Australian Catholic University in Melbourne, Australia. He has written extensively on epistemic justification, reasons, and evidence.
