The Secret Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations in Oslo
Their Success and Why the Process Ultimately Failed
The Oslo secret negotiations from 1992 to 1993 were some of the most astonishing and also successful negotiations in the Middle East, leading to the mutual recognition between the PLO and Israel.
Through an in-depth examination of the Oslo negotiations, this book argues that at the core of the negotiations was a fascinating dilemma of recognition. Overcoming this dilemma was at the centre of the secret negotiations.
A thorough analysis documents how decision makers tried to communicate without being able to engage in face-to-face negotiations, and highlights the significance of the role of third parties in the conflict resolution process, stressing in particular the importance of the European Union’s power in bringing the sides together.
This is a comprehensive account of the Oslo negotiations, focusing particularly on the timely issue of non-recognition – which is of great importance today given the recent emergence of the rise of Hamas as the dominant Palestinian political force.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction 2. Israel and the PLO: Facing International and Domestic Challenges 3. Let’s Argue: A Constructivist Approach to Understanding the Oslo Talks 4. Cautious Rapprochement: A Rational Choice Approach to Understanding the Oslo Talks 5. Bargaining in Oslo 6. The Success of the Oslo Talks – And Why the Process Failed
Sven Behrendt is a leading expert in international negotiations and conflict resolution. He joined the World Economic Forum in Geneva, Switzerland in 2000 where he facilitates dialogue between the public and private sector on global policy issues. He initiated numerous second-track processes in the Middle East for the Bertelsmann Foundation and is co- editor of Bound to Cooperate: Europe and the Middle East.
"As this book illustrates, Israelis and Palestinians are bound to cooperate, even if this is difficult to realize. The findings of this book will advance our thinking about how to reach peace with Israel." Ahmad Qurei, Former Prime Minister of the Palestine National Authority
"The theory of games is not the first thing that comes to mind when devising a strategy for negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians. But this book illustrates how useful it can be." Muhammad Shtayyeh, Former Minister of Public Works and Housing, Palestine National Authority
"Telling the story of Oslo is one thing, explaining it another. The book is one of the few attempts to answer the question not only what happened in Oslo, but why it happened." Ron Pundak, Director General of the Peres Center for Peace