1st Edition

The Social Contexts of Intellectual Virtue Knowledge as a Team Achievement

By Adam Green Copyright 2017
246 Pages 2 B/W Illustrations
by Routledge

256 Pages 2 B/W Illustrations
by Routledge

256 Pages 2 B/W Illustrations
by Routledge

This book reconceives virtue epistemology in light of the conviction that we are essentially social creatures. Virtue is normally thought of as something that allows individuals to accomplish things on their own. Although contemporary ethics is increasingly making room for an inherently social dimension in moral agency, intellectual virtues continue to be seen in terms of the computing potential... Read more

1. The Basic Challenge and Basic View

2. Role-Based Normativity

3. Empirical Challenges for Testimony

4. Situationism, Heuristics, and a Broader Empirical Challenge

5. Kinds of Credit

6. The Ability Condition

7. Socially Distributed Cognition

8. Authority and Injustice

9. When Social Creatures Disagree

Conclusion

Appendix --Environmental Luck

Biography

Adam Green is an assistant professor of philosophy at Azusa Pacific University. His work ranges over epistemology, the philosophy and cognitive science of religion, and philosophical psychology. His previous work on social epistemology has appeared in American Philosophical Quarterly, Synthese, Episteme, and Philosophical Explorations.

"Adam Green thinks that taking a more social perspective will produce a richer and more plausible version of virtue epistemology—one that can avoid various objections to credit views of knowledge and that can deepen our understanding of both epistemic injustice and the problem of disagreement ... It is an excellent, interesting, and fruitful defense of a credit view of knowledge as well as a valuable contribution to our understanding of how social factors affect knowledge." -- Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews