This book, first published in 1993, closely examines the United States government’s policy toward the Latin American debt crisis in the years 1982 to 1985. The United States under Reagan sought to maintain the problem as strictly a private creditor/debtor issue, and avoided the internationalization of the problem. With the election of Bush, however, government policy changed in 1989, and this book analyses the different approaches of both administrations, the successes and failures of their policies, and the eventual resolution of the debt crisis.
Table of Contents
1. The International Debt Crisis Enters the 1980s 1.1. National Factors 1.2. International Factors 2. U.S. Intervention in the Debt Renegotiations of Mexico, Brazil and Argentina: An Effort in Market Maintenance 2.1. Mexico: Test Case for Crisis Management 2.2. Brazil: U.S. Resists Efforts to Bypass Established Mechanisms 2.3. Argentina: The More Things Change the More They Stay the Same 3. A Systemic-Centred Explanation of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy and the Latin American Debt Crisis 3.1. Systemic-Centred Explanations 3.2. Interdependence 3.3. International Regime Analysis 3.4. The Evolution of the International Financial System: Centralized/Official to Decentralized/Private 4. Common Beliefs, Values and Perspectives: the Economic Culture of the Reagan Administration 4.1. Beliefs Systems, Shared Values and the Study of Foreign Economic Policy 4.2. The Fostering of a Liberal Trade and Financial Regime: Theoretical and Institutional Roots 4.3. The Free Market Ethos and the Reagan Administration’s Debt Policy 5. Anatomy of the State: The Role of Governmental Structure and Process 5.1. Revival of ‘The State’ as a Conceptual Variable 5.2. The Independence of U.S. International Monetary Policy-Making 5.3. Private International Banks and Debt Policy 5.4. Historical Evolution of the Organization: The Rise of the Treasury Department 5.5. The Role of the Fed 5.6 The Department of State: Where Art Thou? 5.7. The Failure of Coordination 5.8. The Limited Involvement of the President and Its Impact on Policy 5.9. The Role of the National Security Council and the Senior Interagency Group on International Economic Policy (SIGIEP) 5.10. On the Periphery: Congress and the Making of U.S. Debt Policy 6. Conclusion 6.1. The Post-1985 Period