1st Edition

US Special Forces and Counterinsurgency in Vietnam Military Innovation and Institutional Failure, 1961-63

By Christopher K. Ives Copyright 2007
200 Pages 1 B/W Illustrations
by Routledge

198 Pages 1 B/W Illustrations
by Routledge

200 Pages 1 B/W Illustrations
by Routledge

This volume examines US Army Special Forces efforts to mobilize and train indigenous minorities in Vietnam. Christopher K. Ives shows how before the Second Indochina War, the Republic of Vietnam had begun to falter under the burden of an increasingly successful insurgency. The dominant American military culture could not conform to President Kennedy’s guidance to wage 'small wars', while... Read more
Introduction  1. Crossbows to Carbines  2. Combatants and Continuities  3. Contexts, Doctrines, and Discontinuities  4. Counterinsurgency in Vietnam: Competing Discourses  5. Choosing the Wrong Trails  6. Threatened Hamlets and Bad Advice  7.  Operational Innovation, Institutional Failure  Appendix 1  Constituent Elements of Knowledge  Selected Bibliography

Biography

Christopher Ives holds a PhD in history from the Ohio State University, and is a veteran of the US Special Forces, with over 20 years' service. He now works as a security analyst.