This volume provides a collection of insightful essays on all phases of the Iraq War: both US-led major combat operations to defeat the Ba’athist regime as well as efforts to reconstruct the country and defeat the insurgency.
Written by leading scholars on the Iraq War, many of whom have practical first-hand experience of the war, the book includes a Conclusion by leading US strategic thinker Eliot Cohen. This is the first work on the Iraq War to incorporate an understanding of the Iraqi side of the war, based on a systematic analysis of captured Iraqi archives.
War in Iraq will be of great interest to students of the Iraq War, small wars and insurgencies, international security and strategic studies in general.
Table of Contents
Introduction Thomas A. Keaney and Thomas G. Mahnken Part 1: Defeating the Regime and Occupying Iraq 1. American Anabasis: The United States Army's Entry into War in Iraq Isaiah Wilson 2. Iraqi Military Effectiveness Kevin M. Woods, with Michael R. Pease, Mark E. Stout, Williamson Murray and James G. Lacey 3. The Afghan Model in Northern Iraq Richard Andres 4. Deep Attack against Iraq: Precision Weapon, Cyber Attack and the Future of War Richard Andres 5. Doomed Execution: Iraq and its War Plan Kevin M. Woods, with Michael R. Pease, Mark E. Stout, Williamson Murray and James G. Lacey 6. Mission Not Accomplished: What Went Wrong with Iraqi Reconstruction Nora Bensahel Part 2: Reconstructing Iraq and Countering the Insurgency 7. Origins, Causes, and Evolution of the Iraqi Insurgency, 2003-06 Ahmed Hashim 8. Signaling Resolve and the First Battle of Fallujah Carter Malkasian 9. Counterinsurgency in Iraq - The Karbala Model Peter R. Mansoor 10. Extinguishing the Insurgency in Iraq: A Civil Affairs Perspective John Ballard 11. The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in Iraq Kalev I. Sepp 12. Rediscovering the Way of Lawrence, Some Thoughts on Postmodern Planning Isaiah Wilson. Conclusion: The Iraq War in Context Eliot A. Cohen