Throughout his career, Wittgenstein was preoccupied with issues in the philosophy of perception. Despite this, little attention has been paid to this aspect of Wittgenstein's work. This volume redresses this lack, by bringing together an international group of leading philosophers to focus on the impact of Wittgenstein's work on the philosophy of perception. The ten specially commissioned chapters draw on the complete range of Wittgenstein's writings, from his earliest to latest extant works, and combine both exegetical approaches with engagements with contemporary philosophy of mind. Topics covered include:
- perception and judgement in the Tractatus
- the putative intentionality of perception
The book also includes an overview which summarises the evolution of Wittgenstein's views on perception throughout his life. With an outstanding array of contributors, Wittgenstein and Perception is essential reading for students and scholars of Wittgenstein’s work, as well as those working in philosophy of mind and philosophy of perception.
Contributors: Yasuhiro Arahata, Michael Campbell, William Child, Daniel Hutto, Michael O’Sullivan, Marie McGinn, Michel terHark, Charles Travis, and José Zalabardo.
Table of Contents
Introduction Michael Campbell and Michael O'Sullivan 1. Wittgenstein on Perception: an Overview Michael Campbell and Michael O'Sullivan 2. Two Senses of ‘See’ Marie McGinn 3. Suffering Intentionally? Charles Travis 4. Contentless Perceiving: The Very Idea Dan Hutto 5. Wittgenstein, Phenomenal Concepts, and What It’s Like William Child 6. Seeing and Not-seeing as Ways of Inhabiting the World Yasuhiro Arahata 7. Wittgenstein’s Nonsense Objection José Zalabardo 8. Judgement and Aspect Michael O'Sullivan 9. Aspect perception in the Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations Michel terHark. Index
Michael Campbell is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the Philosophy Department at Kyoto University, Japan.
Michael O’Sullivan is a Tutor in the Department of Philosophy at King’s College London, UK.
"… I think this is a good volume. The individual papers are, for the most part, clearly and carefully argued. They raise interesting questions both about perception and about Wittgenstein's thoughts about perception, and they usefully speak to each other in both obvious and unobvious ways. … The editors' overview is substantive and broad, and it offers some original and insightful observations." - Avner Baz, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews