Aris  Trantidis Author of Evaluating Organization Development

Aris Trantidis

Lecturer (Assistant Professor) in International Relations and Politics
University of Lincoln

I am interested in the interplay between politics and the economy. I study the pathologies of the political process and I explore questions such as how politics work under different institutions and economic systems, whether democratic representation fulfils its promise of public control over state policy, how economic policy helps the success of some authoritarian leaders and whether political extremism poses a threat to liberal democracy through a socioeconomic agenda of control.

Subjects: History


I am currently a Lecturer in International Relations and Politics at the University of Lincoln, the School of Social and Political Sciences. I was previously a Max Weber Fellow at the European University Institute (EUI), a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Department of Economics at George Mason University and a Visiting Lecturer and Teaching Fellow at the Department of Political Economy at King’s College London. I have a PhD from King’s College London and I hold degrees from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) and the Universities of Surrey, Thessaloniki and Athens.

Areas of Research / Professional Expertise

    My research focuses on three thematic areas:

    a) the interplay between politics and economic policy, with a focus on clientelism and political corruption as well as on the feedback between economics as a discipline and economic policy as practice;

    b) democratic representation and the pathologies of the political process, with a focus on hegemonic semi-authoritarian regimes and the nationalist Right;

    c) the epistemology of political science, with emphasis on social change from the perspective of historical institutionalism and complexity theory.

    My research has been published in several journals, such as the ‘Journal of European Public Policy’, the ‘British Journal of Politics and International Relations’, ‘Politics’, ‘Constitutional Political Economy’, and ‘Democratization’.

Personal Interests

    I love long walks and travelling



Featured Title
 Featured Title - Clientelism and Economic Reforms - Trantidis - 1st Edition book cover


The SAGE Encyclopedia of Political Behavior


Published: May 23, 2017 by The SAGE Encyclopedia of Political Behavior
Authors: Aris Trantidis

Sultanism is a type of autocratic regime in which political power is concentrated in the hands of the ruler and is unbound by political and legal rules. Political authority engulfs social and economic life and follows no elaborate ideology. The regime elicits loyalty through favoritism toward its supporters, reprisals against its opponents, and the repression of civil society.

The British Journal of Politics and International Relations

Clientelism and Corruption: Institutional Adaptation of State Capture Strategies in View of Resource Scarcity in Greece

Published: Mar 30, 2017 by The British Journal of Politics and International Relations
Authors: Aris Trantidis, Vasiliki Tsagkroni

How do strategies of state capture adapt to tight fiscal conditions? The article uses a historical institutionalist approach and content analysis to study the case of Greece. Three theoretically relevant patterns of institutional adaptation are unearthed.


Is Age a Case for Electoral Quotas? A Benchmark for Affirmative Action in Politics

Published: Feb 26, 2017 by Representation
Authors: Aris Trantidis

Is age a suitable case for electoral quotas on the same grounds invoked for women in politics? Drawing from the literature on women in politics, this article sets up empirical indicators to examine whether the age-related pattern of political under-representation is linked to stereotypes and bias that negatively affect its engagement in politics and to raise questions about the boundaries of identity and the limits of politics as a vehicle for social change.

Constitutional Political Economy

The problem of constitutional legitimation: what the debate on electoral quotas tells us about the legitimacy of decision-making rules in constitutional choice

Published: Jan 18, 2017 by Constitutional Political Economy
Authors: Aris Trantidis

Proponents of electoral quotas have a ‘dependent interpretation’ of democracy, i.e. they have formed an opinion on which decision-making rules are fair on the basis of their prior approval of the outcomes these rules are likely to generate. The article argues that this position causes an irresolvable problem for constitutional processes that seek to legitimately enact institutional change.

Journal of European Public Policy

Clientelism and economic policy: hybrid characteristics of collective action in Greece

Published: Nov 11, 2016 by Journal of European Public Policy
Authors: Aris Trantidis

The article argues that clientelism may permeate organizations such as labour unions. This merger gives rise to a clientelist-collective system with important implications for the design of economic policy. As evidence from Greece shows, patrons in government are better off avoiding reforms that deprive their client groups of collective and personal benefits (clientelist bias in policy-making).


Is government contestability an integral part of the definition of democracy?

Published: May 19, 2016 by Politics
Authors: Aris Trantidis

The article examines the boundaries between democracy and authoritarianism, broadens the notion of authoritarian controls to include soft manipulative practices and explains why government contestability should be regarded as a constitutive property of democracy.

South European Society and Politics

Reforms and Collective Action in a Clientelist System: Greece during the Mitsotakis Administration (1990–93)

Published: Mar 24, 2014 by South European Society and Politics
Authors: Aris Trantidis

Economic reforms face a collective action problem: they trigger the reaction of groups that expect significant losses, while the government must forge a support coalition among those who anticipate gains. This makes certain types of economic reform, such as privatisation and structural reforms, particularly risky for governments in a clientelist system.


Clientelism and the classification of dominant party systems

Published: Oct 25, 2013 by Democratization
Authors: Aris Trantidis

The view of clientelism as an abuse of state power casts doubt on the democratic credentials of highly clientelistic political systems.The article puts forward two propositions about the circumstances under which clientelism infringes basic democratic standards. Clientelism under one-party monopoly engenders authoritarianism when it thwarts and punishes the contesting voice of citizens by effectively blocking exit from its incentives and sanctions.