This book offers a systematic look at current challenges in moral epistemology through the lens of research on higher-order evidence. Fueled by recent advances in empirical research, higher-order evidence has generated a wealth of insights about the genealogy of moral beliefs. Higher-Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology explores how these insights have an impact on the epistemic status of moral beliefs.
The essays are divided into four thematic sections. Part I addresses higher-order evidence against morality that comes from sources such as disagreement and moral psychology. Part II covers rebuttals of higher-order evidence against morality. The essays in Part III examine the relevance of higher-order evidence for a broader range of phenomena in moral epistemology, for both individuals and groups, including moral testimony and phenomena of practical concern, such as fundamentalist views about moral matters. Finally, Part IV discusses permissible epistemic attitudes regarding a body of moral evidence, including the question of how to determine the permissibility of such attitudes.
This volume is the first to explicitly address the implications of higher-order evidence in moral epistemology. It will be of interest to researchers and advanced graduate students working in epistemology and metaethics.
Table of Contents
Change in Moral View: Higher-Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology
Part I: Higher-Order Evidence against Morality
1. Evolutionary Debunking, Self-Defeat and All the Evidence
2. Moral Intuitions Between Higher-Order Evidence and Wishful Thinking
3. Debunking Objective Consequentialism: The Challenge of Knowledge-Centric Anti-Luck Epistemology
4. Disagreement, Indirect Defeat, and Higher-Order Evidence
Olle Risberg & Folke Tersman
Part II: Rebutting Higher-Order Evidence against Morality
5. Higher-Order Defeat in Realist Moral Epistemology
Brian C. Barnett
6. Moral Peer Disagreement and the Limits of Higher-Order Evidence
7. Debunking Scepticism
Part III: Broader Implications of Higher-Order Evidence in Moral Epistemology
8. Moral Testimony as Higher-Order Evidence
Marcus Lee, Neil Sinclair, & Jon Robson
9. Higher-Order Defeat in Collective Moral Epistemology
J. Adam Carter & Dario Mortini
10. The Fragile Epistemology of Fanaticism
Part IV: Permissible Epistemic Attitudes in Response to Higher-Order Evidence in Moral Epistemology
11. How Rational Level-Splitting Beliefs Can Help You Respond to Moral Disagreement
Margaret Greta Turnbull & Eric Sampson
12. Epistemic Non-Factualism and Methodology
Michael Klenk works at the intersection of metaethics, epistemology, and moral psychology. His published papers on these topics in Synthese, Ratio, the Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, and the Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, among others. He works at Delft University of Technology and held visiting positions at St. Gallen and Stanford University.
"In sum, this is a rich collection of essays from which researchers and students in both epistemology and moral philosophy will benefit. It both deepens and broadens our understanding of higher-order evidence, disagreement, and debunking arguments, and I expect several of the essays in this collection will influence future work of these issues." – Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews