This is the first collection of essays exclusively devoted to knowledge from non-knowledge and related issues. It features original contributions from some of the most prominent and up-and-coming scholars working in contemporary epistemology.
There is a nascent literature in epistemology about the possibility of inferential knowledge based on premises that are, for one reason or another, not known. The essays in this book explore if and how epistemology can accommodate cases where knowledge is generated from something other than knowledge. Can reasoning from false beliefs generate knowledge? Can reasoning from unjustified beliefs generate knowledge? Can reasoning from gettiered beliefs generate knowledge? Can reasoning from propositions one does not even believe generate knowledge? The contributors to this book tackle these and other questions head-on. Together, they advance the debate about knowledge from non-knowledge in novel and interesting directions.
Illuminating Errors will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working in epistemology and philosophy of mind.
Introduction Rodrigo Borges and Ian Schnee
Part 1: The Possibility of Knowledge from Non-Knowledge
Section 1: Justification and Essential Falsehoods
1. Norms of Belief and Knowledge from Non-Knowledge E.J. Coffman
2. We Are Justified in Believing that KFK is Fundamentally Wrong Peter D. Klein
3. No Knowledge From Falsity Fred Adams
4. Harmless Falsehoods Martin Montminy
5. Knowledge from Blindspots Rhys Borchert, Juan Comesaña, and Timothy Kearl
Section 2: Gettier, Safety and Defeasibility
6. Knowledge from Error and Anti-Risk Virtue Epistemology Duncan Pritchard
7. Epistemic Alchemy? Stephen Hetherington
8. The Benign/Malignant Distinction for False Premises Claudio de Almeida
9. Knowledge, Falsehood, and Defeat Sven Bernecker
Part 2: Beyond the Possibility of Knowledge from Non-Knowledge
Section 3: Reasoning, Hinges and Cornerstones
10. The Developmental Psychology of Sherlock Holmes: Counter-Closure Precedes Closure Roy Sorensen
11. Inferential Knowledge, Counter Closure, and Cognition Michael Blome-Tillmann and Brian Ball
12. Knowledge from Non-Knowledge in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty: A Dialogue Michael Veber
13. Vaults Across Reasoning Peter Murphy
14. Entitlement, Leaching and Counter-Closure Federico Luzzi
Section 4: Knowledge: From Falsehoods and of Falsehoods
15. Why is Knowledge from Falsehood Possible? An Explanation John Turri
16. The Assertion Norm of Knowing John Biro
17. Knowledge Without Factivity Kate Nolfi
18. Knowing the Facts, Alternative and Otherwise Clayton Littlejohn
"This book is unique in that it takes a highly focused set of questions that revolve around knowledge from non-knowledge and advances discussion of these questions from the perspectives of hinge-epistemology, anti-luck approaches to knowledge involving both safety and sensitivity constraints, virtue-theoretic epistemology, and knowledge-first approaches that emphasize the roles knowledge plays in licensing both theoretical and practical inferences."
Aaron Rizzieri, Coconino Community College