1st Edition

Negative Incentives and Disciplinary Action in China’s Food Safety Regulation

By Jia Liu Copyright 2027
160 Pages 5 B/W Illustrations
by Routledge

This book offers a systematic and original analysis of how disciplinary pressure shapes food safety regulation in China. Focusing on punishment as a regulatory incentive, the book shows that disciplinary action is driven not only by regulatory failure, but also by public opinion, institutional design and the discretionary space within which regulators work. Combining historical analysis,... Read more

Chapter 1: When Punishment Shapes Regulation: Unpacking Negative Incentives in China’s Food Safety Governance  Chapter 2: From Criticism to Crackdown: 75 Years of China’s Food Safety Disciplinary System (1949–2024)  Chapter 3: The Missing Piece: Why Negative Incentives in Non-Western Regulation Have Been Overlooked  Chapter 4: Inside the Black Box: A Mixed-Methods Journey to Study Regulatory Discipline  Chapter 5: Two Cities, One Challenge: How Shenzhen and Beijing Shape Disciplinary Choices  Chapter 6: Incentives Under Pressure: A Principal-Agent Framework for Regulatory Discipline  Chapter 7: Numbers Don’t Lie: Quantifying What Drives Regulatory Discipline  Chapter 8: Beyond Punishment: Rethinking Regulatory Accountability in China and Globally

Biography

Jia Liu is a Lecturer & Master’s Supervisor for the Department of Public Administration, School of Urban Economics and Public Administration, Capital University of Economics and Business, Beijing, China. They are a holder of dual doctoral degrees in Public Administration and Public Policy (jointly awarded by Renmin University of China and City University of Hong Kong), with specialized research expertise in food safety regulation, risk governance, and principal-agent dynamics in public administration.

"If the food we eat is safe, we can thank unseen regulators. Drawing on in-depth case research, Jia Liu's fascinating book sheds light on how food safety regulators operate in China - under high pressure from multiple principals who rely on negative incentives."

Nick Petrovsky, Department of Public and International Affairs, City University of Hong Kong