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Political Competition and Economic Regulation




ISBN 9781138806825
Published June 18, 2014 by Routledge
304 Pages 18 B/W Illustrations

 
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Book Description

Organized, readable, technically sound and comprehensive from both theoretical and empirical standpoints, this book summarizes a vast amount of institutional, historical and descriptive detail.

Using case studies from the US, Canada, Germany and Switzerland as well as the European Union and the global economy, this is the first book of its kind to examine historical evidence on how competition among states – or the lack of it – affects regulation, especially labour market regulation.

Edited by internationally respected scholars of economics and containing contributions from eminent economists, this book reveals important implications as to whether European political integration leads to more regulation and whether globalization restrains regulation. It will be of great interest to both economists and students engaged with political economy, public choice and regulation.

Table of Contents

1. The Effect of Interjurisdictional Competition on Regulation: Theory and Overview  2. Politico-economic Causes of Labour Regulation in the United States: Rent Seeking, Alliances, Raising Rivals’ Costs (Even Lowering One’s Own?) and Interjurisdictional Competition  3. Interjurisdictional Competition in Regulation: Evidence for Canada at the Provincial Level  4. Labour Market Regulation in the European Union: Causes and Consequences  5. Was there Regulatory Competition in Early Modern Germany?  6. Regulatory Competition and Federalism in Switzerland: Diffusion by Horizontal and Vertical Interaction  7. The Drivers of Deregulation in the Era of Globalization

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Reviews

"In this book, Professors Bernholz and Vaubel have edited a volume that asks a very important question: how does competition between and among political units influence regulatory outcomes? The contributions complement each other very well and cover a wide array of theoretical ideas, compare a variety of institutional settings, and summarize a huge amount of empirical work. They also find that often elusive trait of combining technically sound and detailed summaries with readability and an eye toward the bigger picture." Brian Goff, Western Kentucky University