For the past fifteen years, Aikin and Talisse have been working collaboratively on a new vision of American pragmatism, one which sees pragmatism as a living and developing philosophical idiom that originates in the work of the "classical" pragmatisms of Charles Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, uninterruptedly develops through the later 20th Century pragmatists (C. I. Lewis, Wilfrid Sellars, Nelson Goodman, W. V. O. Quine), and continues through the present day. According to Aikin and Talisse, pragmatism is fundamentally a metaphilosophical proposal – a methodological suggestion for carrying inquiry forward amidst ongoing deep disagreement over the aims, limitations, and possibilities of philosophy. This conception of pragmatism not only runs contrary to the dominant self-understanding among cotemporary philosophers who identify with the classical pragmatists, it also holds important implications for pragmatist philosophy. In particular, Aikin and Talisse show that their version of pragmatism involves distinctive claims about epistemic justification, moral disagreement, democratic citizenship, and the conduct of inquiry. The chapters combine detailed engagements with the history and development of pragmatism with original argumentation aimed at a philosophical audience beyond pragmatism.
Foreword Cheryl Misak
1. Introduction: The Problems of Pragmatist Philosophers
Part I. Encounters with the Classical Idiom
2. Peirce’s Mixed Theory of Epistemic Justification
3. Fixing Belief as Epistemic Conduct
4. Clifford’s Pragmatism and the Will to Believe
5. James’s Moral Philosophy
6. What is Living and What is Dead in Deweyan Political Theory
Part II. Pragmatism and Metaphilosophy
7. Against Triumphalism: Defending Analytic Pragmatism
8. Metaphilosophical Creep
9. Pragmatist Metaphilosophy and Skepticism
Part III. Pragmatist Proposals
10. Can Pragmatist be Pluralists?
11. The Ethics of Inquiry
12. Global Expressivism: Is it Still Cool?
13. On a Certain Blindness in Pragmatist Political Philosophy
14. Public Argument in a Free Society
15. Epilogue: Pragmatism as Minimalist Metaphilosophy