1st Edition
Seemings and the Foundations of Justification A Defense of Phenomenal Conservatism
All justified beliefs ultimately rest on attitudes that are immediately justified. This book illuminates the nature of immediate justification and the states that provide it. Simply put, immediate justification arises from how things appear to us—from all and only our "seemings."
The author defends each aspect of this "seemings foundationalism," including the assumption of foundationalism itself. Most notably, the author draws from common sense philosopher Thomas Reid to present new and improved arguments for phenomenal conservatism and gives the first systematic argument that seemings alone are capable of immediately justifying. The discussion delves deeply into the nature of seemings and how it is that their assertive phenomenal character makes them (and them alone) capable of immediately justifying. Along the way, the author makes novel contributions to perennial debates such as: internalism versus externalism, deontologism and epistemic blame, epistemic circularity, and the common sense response to skepticism.
Seemings and the Foundations of Justification will appeal to scholars and advanced students interested in epistemology, Thomas Reid, or the common sense tradition.
Introduction
1. Classical Deontologism
2. Immediate Justification and Seemings Foundationalism
3. Some Objections to Phenomenal Conservatism
4. What Are Seemings?
5. Foundationalism Defended
6. The Case for Seemings Exclusivism
7. Against Epistemic Conservatism
8. A Reidian Argument for Phenomenal Conservatism, Part I: Some Seemings
9. A Reidian Argument for Phenomenal Conservatism, Part II: All Seemings
Biography
Blake McAllister (PhD, Baylor University) is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Hillsdale College. He has published extensively in epistemology with special emphasis in early modern and religious epistemology. His work has appeared in venues such as Synthese, Faith & Philosophy, and History of Philosophy Quarterly.
“Blake McAllister presents a highly original and well-argued defense of phenomenal conservatism. With such able defenders, there is a reason that phenomenal conservatism is an increasingly popular view of epistemic justification.”
Logan Paul Gage, Franciscan University of Steubenville, USA
