This collection of original essays explores the topic of skeptical invariantism in theory of knowledge. It eschews historical perspectives and focuses on this traditionally underexplored, semantic characterization of skepticism.
The book provides a carefully structured, state-of-the-art overview of skeptical invariantism and offers up new questions and avenues for future research. It treats this semantic form of skepticism as a serious position rather than assuming that skepticism is false and attempting to diagnose where arguments for skepticism go wrong. The essays take up a wide range of different philosophical perspectives on three key questions in the debate about skeptical invariantism: (1) whether the standards for knowledge vary, (2) how demanding the standards for knowledge are, and (3) whether the kind of evidence, reasons, methods, processes etc. that we can bring to bear are sufficient to meet those standards.
Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered will be of interest to scholars and advanced students in epistemology and philosophy of language.
Table of Contents
Christos Kyriacou & Kevin Wallbridge
Part I. The Source of Skepticism
2. Sceptical Invariantism and the Source of Scepticism Sceptical Invariantism and the Source of Scepticism
3. Epistemic Standards: Impersonal, not Invariant
Part II. Arguments for Infallibilist Skepticism
4. A Cumulative Case Argument for Infallibilism
5. Skeptical Invariantism, Considered
6. Moderate Pragmatic Skepticism, Moorean Invariantism, and Attributions of Intellectual Virtue/Vice
Part III. Arguments for Fallibilist Skepticism
7. In Defense of a Moderate Skeptical Invariantism
8. A (Partial) Defence of Moderate Skeptical Invariantism
9. Skepticism, Fallibilism, and Rational Evaluation
10. Situationism, Implicit Bias, and Skepticism
Part IV. Wittgensteinian Anti-Skepticism
11. "I Know", "I know", "I know." Hinge Epistemology, Invariantism and Skepticism
12. ‘Logical’ and ‘Epistemic’ Uses of ‘to Know’ or ‘Hinges’ as Logical Enabling Conditions
Part V. Assertion and Knowledge Discourse
13. Assertion Compatibilism
14. Knowledge and Loose Talk
15. Knowledge Claims and the Context of Assessment
Wayne A. Davis
Christos Kyriacou is a Lecturer at the University of Cyprus and received his PhD in Philosophy from the University of Edinburgh. His main interests lie in epistemology, metaethics and their intersection.
Kevin Wallbridge works on issues in epistemology, the philosophy of language, and the philosophy of mind. He has been a lecturer at the University of Southampton and a postdoctoral research fellow at the University of Cyprus. His PhD is from the University of Edinburgh.
"This volume represents a fresh wave of renewed reflection on the venerable topic of skeptical invariantism. The contributions to this volume provide a much-needed update to the discussion of this important topic, bringing skeptical invariantism into dialogue with recent developments in contemporary epistemology." – James R. Beebe, University at Buffalo, USA