This is the first book to explore the connections and interactions between social epistemology and epistemic relativism. The essays in the volume are organized around three distinct philosophical approaches to this topic: 1) foundational questions concerning deep disagreement, the variability of epistemic norms, and the relationship between relativism and reliabilism; 2) the role of relativistic themes in feminist social epistemology; and 3) the relationship between the sociology of knowledge, philosophy of science, and social epistemology.
Recent trends in social epistemology seek to rectify earlier work that conceptualized cognitive achievements primarily on the level of isolated individuals. Relativism insists that epistemic judgements or beliefs are justified or unjustified only relative to systems of standards—there is not neutral way of adjudicating between them. By bringing together these two strands of epistemology, this volume offers unique perspectives on a number of central epistemological questions.
Social Epistemology and Relativism will be of interest to researchers working in epistemology, feminist philosophy, and the sociology of knowledge.
Natalie Alana Ashton, Martin Kusch, Robin McKenna and Katharina Anna Sodoma
Part I: Foundational Issues in Social Epistemology
2. Hinge Disagreement
Annalisa Coliva and Michele Palmira
3. Norms of Inquiry in the Theory of Justified Belief
Sanford C. Goldberg
4. Relativism: The Most Ecumenical View?
5. Naturalism, Psychologism, Relativism
Part II: Feminist Epistemology and Social Epistemology
6. Relativism in Feminist Epistemologies
Natalie Alana Ashton
7. Feminist Epistemology and Pragmatic Encroachment
8. Charity, Peace, and the Social Epistemology of Science Controversies
9. Epistemic Responsibility and Relativism
Part III: Social Epistemology and the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge
10. Sociologism and Relativism
11. Sociologistic Accounts of Normativity
12. Relativism in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge Revisited