1st Edition
The Dual Force of Welfare Unravelling Personal and Impersonal Views in Ethics
1. Introduction Part 1: Disambiguating the Personal-Impersonal Distinction 2. The Ambiguity of the Personal-Impersonal Distinction 3. Distinguishing Personal and Impersonal Views in Welfare Ethics Part 2: Discussing the Various Personal-Impersonal Distinctions 4. The Ground of the Moral Value of Welfare 5. Types of Personal Value I: Existence-Comparativism 6. Types of Personal Value II: The Personal Absolute Type 7. Types of Personal Value III: The Intrapersonal Comparative Type 8. Types of Personal Value IV: The Interpersonal Comparative Type 9. Moral Aggregation 10. Interpersonal Welfare Trade-offs Part 3: Developing a Dual Theory of Outcome Comparisons 11. A Dual Theory for Two-Outcome Comparisons 12. Essential Comparativeness and Non-Transitivity 13. Refining the Comparative View
14. A Dual Theory for Multiple-Outcome Comparisons 15. Loose Ends and Further Thoughts 16. Conclusion
Biography
Jonas Harney is Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland. His research focuses on moral and decision theory, particularly welfare ethics, aggregation, population ethics, essentially comparative views, and dynamic decisions. His published work has appeared in Analysis, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, The Journal of Ethics, Philosophy & Public Affairs, and Utilitas.
“The list of acute observations about the different roles welfare plays in ethics is impressive, and the philosophical writing exemplary in style, analytic thoroughness, and substance. This book is a prodigious piece of philosophy which I wholeheartedly recommend to anyone who works on the moral importance of welfare.
Krister Bykvist, Professor in Practical Philosophy, Stockholm University






