1st Edition
The Ethics of Belief and Beyond Understanding Mental Normativity
1. Introduction: Towards an Ethics of Mind
Sebastian Schmidt
Part I: New Perspectives on Belief Normativity
A. Doxastic Agency and Responsibility
2. Implications of the Debate on Doxastic Voluntarism for W. K. Clifford’s Ethics of Belief
Martina Lindner
3. Believing as We Ought and the Democratic Route to Knowledge
Matthew Chrisman
4. Responsibility for Doxastic Strength Grounds Responsibility for Belief
Benoit Gaultier
B. Reasons for Belief
5. Relationships and Reasons for Belief
Lindsay Crawford
6. Instrumental Reasons for Belief: Elliptical Talk and Elusive Properties
Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen and Mattias Skipper
7. Suspension of Judgment, Rationality’s Competition, and the Reach of the Epistemic
Errol Lord
Part II: Facets of an Ethics of Mind
A. Responsibility, Reasons, and Rationality
8. Responsibility for Attitudes, Object-Given Reasons, and Blame
Sebastian Schmidt
9. Two Kinds of Rationality
Gerhard Ernst
B. The Ethics of Blame, Fear, Decision, Passing Thought, and Phantasy
10. The Ethics of Blame: A Primer
D. Justin Coates
11. How Safe Should We Feel? The Ethics of Fear in the Public Sphere
Sabine A. Döring
12. Determining the Future
Matthew Soteriou
13. Silence and Salience: On Being Judgmental
Neal A. Tognazzini
14. The Value of a Free and Wandering Mind
Miriam Schleifer McCormick
Biography
Sebastian Schmidt is a Postdoctoral Researcher in Philosophy at the University of Zurich at the chair for Theoretical Philosophy (Anne Meylan). His research in epistemology and metaethics focusses on responsibility and reasons for attitudes.
Gerhard Ernst holds a chair for Philosophy at the Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg (Germany). Since 2018 he is president of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Philosophie (German Society for Philosophy). His main research areas are epistemology and metaethics. His works include Das Problem des Wissens (The Problem of Knowledge) (2002) and Die Objektivität der Moral (The Objectivity of Morality) (2008).
"Specialists in the ethics of action and the nature of practical reason now routinely interact with specialists in epistemology and the normativity of belief to address broader issues in the normativity of all kinds of mental states. As both fields learn from another, new questions and new avenues for inquiry come into view. This is a welcome collection of new essays by first-rate philosophers in the emerging field of mental normativity." – Peter J. Graham, University of California, Riverside, USA
