When corruption is exposed, unknown aspects are revealed which allow us to better understand its structures and informal norms. This book investigates the hidden order of corruption, looking at the invisible codes and mechanisms that govern and stabilize the links between corrupters and corruptees. Concentrating mainly on democratic regimes, this book uses a wide range of documentation, including media and judicial sources from Italy and other countries, to locate the internal equilibria and dynamics of corruption in a broad and comparative perspective. It also analyses the Transparency International Annual Reports and the daily survey of international news to present evidence on specific cases of corruption within an institutional theory framework.
'Corruption - often seen as opportunistic rulebreaking-has norms and codes all its own. They are among the most important, yet least understood, reasons why it is so tenacious. Della Porta and Vannucci bring out the "deep structure" of corruption, challenging the ways we look at it and many of our strategies for reform.' Michael Johnston, Colgate University, USA 'Uncertainty, mutual distrust, and fear are usually things to avoid. Yet, Della Porta and Vannucci show that they are essential for the control of corruption. Interpersonal trust and norms of reciprocity facilitate bribery. Their rich and fascinating book illustrates this argument with a wide variety of examples, ranging from Italy to Illinois to Sub-Saharan Africa.' Susan Rose-Ackerman, Yale Law School, USA ’…a wonderfully researched analysis…The authors have skilfully undertaken innovative and path -breaking research and woven it into a strong analytical narrative…This well researched and thoughtful book is original in its analysis of a complex and elusive set of behaviours that invite more criminological research.’ Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology
Contents: The hidden order of corruption: an introduction; The governance structures of corrupt exchanges; Corruption as a normative system; Bureaucratic corruption; Political actors in the governance of corrupt exchanges; The entrepreneurial management of corrupt exchanges; Brokers in corruption networks: the role of middlemen; Organized crime and corruption: mafias as enforcers in the market for corrupt exchange; Snowball effects: how corruption may become endemic; Conclusion: anticorruption policy and the disarticulation of governance structures in corrupt exchanges; Bibliography; Index.