1st Edition
The Western Allies and Soviet Potential in World War II Economy, Society and Military Power
Abbreviations
1 Introduction
1.1 General background
1.2 War potential and the general purpose of this study
2 The Anglo-American assessments in a wider context
2.1 The US and British government organizations responsible for assessing the USSR
2.2 The origins, analysis and dissemination of information
2.3 The assessment’s reliability and the selection of reports for this study
2.4 The reality and contemporary perceptions of war potential
3 The Soviet Union and the West: The pre-war experience and international Great Power politics before World War II
4 From the guarantee to Poland to the Molotov-Ribbentropp pact
4.1 British anguish: The value of the Soviet Union as an ally and the "gathering storm" in Europe
4.2 Soviet war potential and the possible inclusion of the USSR in a "peace front"
4.3 The Soviets propose an alliance
4.4 Assessments on the eve of the Moscow negotiations
5 US pre-Barbarossa assessments
5.1 The economy and its military potential
5.2 The size and efficiency of the armed forces
5.3 Internal stability
6 The Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and its consequences
6.1 The Polish campaign
6.2 The USSR as a potential military adversary
6.3 The Red Army enter Estonia
6.4 Assessments regarding the economy during the autumn
6.5 Soviet air strength – autumn assessments
6.6 Assessments connected to the Soviet–Japanese conflict
6.7 Anglo-French plans to interdict the Soviet oil supply
7 The Soviet–Finnish Winter War
7.1 The Red Army’s performance
7.2 The economy and the internal situation
8 Assessments running up to Barbarossa
8.1 The economy and internal stability
8.2 The production and quality of munitions
8.3 Milita
Biography
Martin Kahn is a Swedish economic historian. He is a docent (associate professor) affiliated with the Department of Economy and Society at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden.
