384 Pages
by
Psychology Press
380 Pages
by
Psychology Press
Also available as eBook on:
First published in 1984. In this book, the authors set forth the central ideas and results of the major theories of coalition forming behavior. These theories address situations of partial conflict of interest with the following aspects: (1) there are three or more players, (2) players may openly communicate with each other, and (3) players form coalitions by freely negotiating agreements on how... Read more
Preface, 1. PROLEGOMENA, 2. THE LANGUAGE OF COOPERATIVE n-PERSON GAMES, 3. TWO CLASSICAL THEORIES: THE CORE AND THE STABLE SET, 4. BARGAINING SETS, 5. POWER BARGAINING SETS, 6. EXCESS THEORIES, 7. THE SHAPLEY VALUE, 8. SIMPLE GAMES (I): INTERPERSONAL CONTROL THEORIES, 9. SIMPLE GAMES (II): EQUITY THEORIES, 10. BARGAINING PROCESS MODELS, 11. PARADIGMS FOR EXPERIMENTAL GAMES, 12. EXPERIMENTAL GAMES: 3-PERSON QUOTA GAMES, 13. OTHER EXPERIMENTAL GAMES, 14. CONCLUDING REMARKS, REFERENCES, AUTHOR INDEX, SUBJECT INDEX
Biography
James P. Kahan The Rand Corporation, Amnon Rapoport University of North Carolina and the University of Haifa.
"...provides the most thorough and ambitious survey of theory and empirical evidence in the field of multi-person cooperative game theory....There is no other text that I know of that will provide mathematically competent social psychologists with a more thorough grounding in this fascinating branch of multi-person game theory."
—British Journal of Social Psychology
